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Jigsaw puzzles are ubiquitous developmental toys in Western societies, used here to examine the development
of metarepresentation. For jigsaw puzzles this entails understanding that individual pieces, when assembled,
produce a picture. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-olds (N = 117) completed jigsaw puzzles that were normal,
had no picture, or comprised noninterlocking rectangular pieces. Pictorial puzzle completion was associated
with mental and graphical metarepresentational task performance. Guide pictures of completed pictorial puz-
zles were not useful. In Experiment 2, 3- to 4-year-olds (N = 52) completed a simplified task, to choose the
correct final piece. Guide-use associated with age and specifically graphical metarepresentation performance.
We conclude that the pragmatically natural measure of jigsaw puzzle completion ability demonstrates general
and pictorial metarepresentational development at 4 years.
Jigsaw puzzles are ubiquitous features of childhood
in Western cultures. Playing with jigsaw puzzles is
believed to benefit hand-eye coordination, spatial
ability, social development, problem-solving strate-
gies, and specific mathematical skills (Fleer, 1990;
Levine, Ratliff, Huttenlocher, & Cannon, 2012;
Young, Cartmill, Levine, & Goldin-Meadow, 2014).
Surprisingly, there has been little research concern-
ing the cognitive processes that underlie jigsaw
puzzle completion.
Two existing studies examine jigsaw puzzle play
in young children, relating it to the development of
spatial abilities. Levine et al. (2012) observed chil-
dren in their homes between the ages of 26 and
46 months. Frequency of play with jigsaw puzzles
and similar puzzles was found to relate to the abil-
ity to mentally transform 2D shapes at 54 months,
suggesting puzzle play promotes spatial skills.
Young et al. (2014) provide partial evidence sup-
porting this idea. They provided instruction during
puzzle play with 4- to 5-year-old children. They
varied the amount of spatial language (e.g., “⋯ it
will fit in one of the corners”) and gesture (e.g.,
tracing the top corners in the frame). Spatial
instruction produced substantial improvement, but
only when combined with gesture. The improve-
ment did not transfer to tests of mental transforma-
tion or spatial vocabulary.
Here we examine the development of jigsaw
puzzle completion directly rather than as a predic-
tor of other spatial skills. Our focus is another fac-
tor involved in jigsaw puzzle play, pictorial
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understanding. This was measured in 3- to 5-year-
olds by (a) comparing use of pictorial information
versus shape information for completion, and (b)
examining the tendency to consult and use informa-
tion from a guide showing the final picture.
Jigsaw puzzles are a particularly apt tool for
measuring pictorial metarepresentation, defined
here as understanding the relationship between the
pictorial medium and the depicted scene. They
form a natural split between seeing a picture as an
object (when in pieces) and treating it transparently
in terms of its content when complete. Efficient
completion of jigsaw puzzles requires understand-
ing that the pieces combine to form a picture; the
picture is not a mysterious side-effect of fitting the
pieces appropriately. Understanding the representa-
tional nature of pictures should enhance jigsaw
puzzle completion, because now content informa-
tion as well as shape can be used.
Representation
Understanding representation is a key milestone
in cognitive development. Metarepresentational
ability, the understanding of the relation between a
representational medium and its referent, has been
argued to develop around 4 years (Doherty, 2009;
Wellman, 1990; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001;
Wimmer & Perner, 1983). This has been widely
studied using the False Belief task. This demon-
strates understanding that action is guided by men-
tal states which represent external situations, and
can misrepresent them (Wellman, 1990; Wimmer &
Perner, 1983). Substantial research evidence has
accumulated indicating comparable developments
in understanding the representational nature of
language occur around the same time. Children
understand that objects can take alternative names,
bunny and rabbit, or rabbit and animal, for example,
around 4 years, and this understanding is associ-
ated with false belief understanding (Doherty &
Perner, 1998; Perner, Stummer, Sprung, & Doherty,
2002). Similar developments have been shown in
the ability to select objects as the referents of novel
names (Gollek & Doherty, 2016; Karadaki &
Doherty, 2017). These associations suggest that pre-
school children are developing a general concept of
representation, applicable across multiple represen-
tational domains.
However, recent work on theory of mind has
raised the possibility that younger children possess
this understanding of mental representation much
earlier than it can be demonstrated in standard
tasks. This may be because of processing limitations
(e.g., Scott & Baillargeon, 2017) or because children
do not interpret the pragmatics of experimental sit-
uations in the way the experimenter intends (Siegel
& Beattie, 1991; Westra & Carruthers, 2017). If cor-
rect, these claims would challenge either the claim
that a general concept of representation develops,
or that it develops around the age of 4 years. A
strong test of the general metarepresentational
development hypothesis is to examine development
in multiple domains, in addition to the mental and
linguistic, also in pictorial metarepresentation.
When and how pictorial metarepresentational
understanding develops is currently unclear. Young
children are adept at interpreting pictures, but
research suggests they do not understand pictures
as representational vehicles before the age of
4 years (Allen & Armitage, 2017; Callaghan, 1999;
Claxton, 2011; Doherty, 2009; Jolley, 2010; Liben,
2003; Simcock & DeLoache, 2006; Thomas, Jolley,
Robinson, & Champion, 1999). They also become
referentially confused between what the picture
depicts and how the real referent currently appears
(Beilin & Pearlman, 1991; Donnelly, Gjersoe, &
Hood, 2013; Robinson, Nye, & Thomas, 1994;
Slaughter, 1998; Wimmer, Robinson, Koenig, & Cor-
der, 2014; Zaitchik, 1990).
Relatedly, children begin to develop an under-
standing of graphic representation such as false
signs by the age of around 4 years (Parkin, 1994;
Parkin & Perner, 1996). In the False Sign task, a
story is acted out in which a sign is supposed to
indicate the location of a princess (Parkin, 1994).
When she moves and the sign is not changed, the
now-false sign misrepresents her location. To cor-
rectly answer the test question “where does the
sign say the princess is?” children must answer on
the basis of what the sign shows, rather than what
is actually the case. This task can be considered a
test of graphic metarepresentation: it assesses the
understanding that one object (a sign) represents
the location of another object. False sign perfor-
mance is typically associated with performance on
the False Belief task (Sabbagh, Moses, & Shiverick,
2006; Leekam, Perner, Healey, & Sewell, 2008; Bow-
ler, Briskman, Gurvidi, & Fornells-Ambrojo, 2005,
used a similar task based on signals of a model
train set; see Perner & Leekam, 2008, for a sum-
mary) suggesting a link between graphic and men-
tal metarepresentational development.
The finding of metarepresentational develop-
ments linked across domains is also supported by
research on ambiguous figures, images with more
than one interpretation. For example, the duck-rabbit
(Jastrow, 1900) can be seen as either a duck or a
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rabbit (e.g., long elements in the picture forming the
duck’s bill or the rabbit’s ears), which is understood
by 4 years (Beck, Robinson, Ahmed, & Abid, 2011;
Doherty & Wimmer, 2005; Wimmer & Doherty,
2011). Understanding how this can be so requires a
distinction between the picture and what it repre-
sents. In this sense ambiguous figures are analogous
to homonyms, words with distinct unrelated mean-
ings (e.g., bat, which can mean either sports equip-
ment or a flying mammal). Doherty (2000) found the
ability to identify homonyms was strongly related to
alternative naming and false belief. The same associ-
ation occurs with ambiguous figures (Wimmer &
Doherty, 2011) with some qualifications. After hav-
ing had the two interpretations pointed out to them,
children can report both interpretations from the age
of about 4 years. This ability is closely associated
with false belief understanding (Doherty & Wimmer,
2005; Wimmer & Doherty, 2011), supporting the
claim for the co-emergence of pictorial and mental
metarepresentation. However, there are reasons for
caution. Although they can acknowledge both inter-
pretations of an ambiguous figure at 4 years, chil-
dren do not appear to experience reversal, the
characteristic switch from one interpretation to
another, until roughly 5 years (Gopnik & Rosati,
2001; Rock, Gopnik, & Hall, 1994). Arguably, under-
standing of ambiguous figures is not yet mature
(Beck et al., 2011). Additionally, ambiguous figures
are peculiar, and plausibly children seldom experi-
ence them. It would be natural to question whether
they are the best stimuli with which to measure typi-
cal development of pictorial metarepresentation.
Other measures are required.
Pictures are made up of lines and patches of color.
Suitably arranged these go to form an image that can
be considered to represent something. Understand-
ing that marks on paper can be assembled to repre-
sent something is the foundation of drawing,
painting, and writing, which children begin to do in
the preschool period (Callaghan, 1999; Callaghan,
Rochat, & Corbit, 2012). By definition this requires
understanding of the relation between the represen-
tational medium and what it represents. Our claim is
that this understanding will improve the efficiency
with which children can complete jigsaw puzzles.
Although a given jigsaw piece may appear a random
set of lines and color patches, suitably assembled
these lines and patches form objects. Assembly
requires connecting lines and colors between con-
tiguous pieces, thus allowing better selection of can-
didate pieces. Without this understanding, the
picture resulting from completing a jigsaw puzzle
may seem a mysterious emergent property.
If this claim is correct, the development of picto-
rial metarepresentation should be evident in
increased efficiency of jigsaw puzzle completion:
children should be able to complete jigsaw puzzles
faster and with less trial and error. The ecological
validity of this measure is clear: children do play
with jigsaw puzzles. They require no special
instruction. The experimenter’s intentions should be
clear. Relative to all the measures above, pragmatic
misinterpretation (Siegel & Beattie, 1991; Westra &
Carruthers, 2017) is unlikely to affect jigsaw com-
pletion. Naturally spatial abilities, working mem-
ory, and various other factors will also be involved.
We do not test these directly here. We test the
hypothesis that in addition to these factors there is
a relation between jigsaw puzzle completion ability
and more traditional tests of metarepresentational
ability, that is false belief (mental) and false sign
(graphical) performances.
Using a Guide
Jigsaw puzzles typically are supplied with a
copy of the completed image, often on the box lid.
This can aid completion if the participant utilizes
the correspondence between the guide and the final
image in selecting and arranging pieces. The rela-
tion between guide and completed picture is one of
geometrical correspondence.
Relevant research about geometrical correspon-
dence in pictures and related physical media sug-
gests that some ability to use the relation between
public representations and their referents emerges
around the age of 2½ or 3 years (DeLoache &
Burns, 1994). A particularly well-known demonstra-
tion uses a scale model of a room (DeLoache, 1987).
The model is laid out in the same way as the room,
with model furniture corresponding to the real fur-
niture in the room. Shown where an object is hid-
den in one of the spaces, children’s task is to find it
in the corresponding space. Children can do this
from roughly 3 years, and in some studies younger
(e.g., DeLoache, Kolstad, & Anderson, 1991).
This suggests a new skill to detect correspon-
dences at this age. However, when identical pieces
of furniture are used (e.g., two identical chairs
placed in different locations) 3-year-olds appear to
choose between identical hiding places at chance
(Blades & Cooke, 1994). Children may simply be
utilizing “element-to-element” correspondence
(Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2000): for example,
shown the small object hidden in the model room
behind a small chair, children know to look behind
the chair in the large room, regardless of where it
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is. When there are two chairs in each space, for
example one by the door and one next to the bed,
they choose at random. Using the additional geo-
metrical information to distinguish between identi-
cal chairs appears to develop around 4 years. If so,
we would not expect children to be able to utilize
the correspondence relation between puzzle guide
and completed image before the age of 4 years.
The Present Study
To sum up: For jigsaw puzzle completion
metarepresentational understanding should help
understand that pictorial elements can combine to
produce an image, providing additional strategies
to fitting pieces together by trial and error. The
additional presence of a box lid or equivalent guide
to the final picture may also help children who
understand geometrical correspondence. We antici-
pate that children who understand that the pictorial
guide is supposed to be related to the final image
will be particularly able to exploit this relation.
To assess the possible involvement of metarepre-
sentation in jigsaw puzzle completion and guide
use, we compare with performance on the False
Belief and False Sign tasks. The False Belief task is
a widely used measure of mental metarepresenta-
tion, and as discussed has been shown to have sub-
stantial associations with measures of linguistic
metarepresentation and, in the form of ambiguous
figures, pictorial metarepresentation. The False Sign
task (Parkin, 1994; Parkin & Perner, 1996) can be
considered a test of graphic metarepresentation. It
may be a particularly appropriate comparator task
for use of the guide, in the sense that both are
physical representations that indicate something
about how the world should be: where the princess
should be, or how the finished jigsaw puzzle
should appear.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 examined what information (shape,
pictorial content, or both) preschool children use to
complete jigsaw puzzles. We varied whether the
puzzle bore a picture and whether the pieces were
characteristically irregular shapes, which allow
solution based solely on fitting pieces together, or
equal-sized rectangles, which do not. Half of partic-
ipants had a guide picture of the completed image.
We hypothesized that children who show evidence
of metarepresentational understanding, indexed by
False Belief and False Sign tasks, will complete
jigsaw puzzles with pictorial content more effi-
ciently, and will be more able to utilize a guide. We
modelled the False Sign task closely on Parkin’s
(1994) version, since it was brief and closely analo-
gous to the unexpected transfer False Belief task.
Jigsaw puzzle completion ability can be mea-
sured in a number of ways. We originally planned
completion time to be the primary measure. Exten-
sive piloting with sixty-eight 3- to 5-year-olds
showed that all could complete a normal six-piece
puzzle within 3 min. We set this as the maximum
time for each puzzle to avoid fatigue effects. How-
ever, as many younger children proved unable to
complete the harder shape-cue or picture-cue puz-
zles within this time, we use two additional mea-
sures: dichotomous ability to complete the jigsaw
puzzle within the time limit, and the number of
times children attempted to join puzzle pieces.
Method
Participants
Participants were 117 children (74 girls), twenty-
nine 3-year-olds (M = 3;8, SD = 4 months), thirty-
nine 4-year-olds (M = 4;7, SD = 3 months), and
forty-nine 5-year-olds (M = 5;7, SD = 5 months) of
white ethnic origin predominantly from lower mid-
dle-class backgrounds from Radstadt and Eben-im-
Pongau, in rural Austria. All children spoke Ger-
man as a first language, as did the experimenter.
For both experiments, inclusion criteria were
informed parental consent and child assent immedi-
ately prior to testing. The exclusion criterion would
have been teacher or parental indication of a spe-
cial-needs diagnosis, but this did not prove the case
in either experiment. The stopping criterion was
that all available children had been tested.
Materials and Procedure
Children were seen in a quiet familiar room for
approximately 15 min.
Jigsaw puzzles. There were three types of six-
piece puzzle measuring 22 × 22 cm (Figure 1). (a)
The normal jigsaw puzzle had typically shaped inter-
locking pieces, which could only connect to the
appropriate adjacent pieces. The picture’s contents
were chosen so that they could not readily be
divided into separate objects when in pieces. Other-
wise the task could have been considered as arrang-
ing a set of objects rather than creating a picture. (b)
The shape-cue jigsaw puzzle had the same-shaped
pieces as the normal puzzle, but no picture. Each
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piece was a different color. (c) The picture-cue jigsaw
puzzle had the same picture as the normal jigsaw
puzzle, but consisted of equally sized rectangles
(11 × 7.3 cm) so that shape did not aid completion.
Each child was shown the assembled puzzle and
asked: “Do you think you could put this back
together if we mess it up?” The puzzle was then
disassembled and the child allowed 3 min to
assemble it. Jigsaw puzzle presentation order was
counterbalanced between participants. Half
(N = 59) had a guide picture placed without com-
ment above the pieces showing the finished image;
half (N = 58) had no guide.
The dependent variables were the ability to com-
plete each puzzle within 3 min, the time taken, and
the number of unnecessary attempts to connect one
side of one piece to another piece, providing an
index of trial and error. Immediate correct assembly
thus scored zero attempts, and lower scores indi-
cate more efficient completion.
False Sign task. A short story was acted out
with two Playpeople dolls, a cardboard castle (a
façade with a picture of a castle 16 cm high × 14
cm wide) and forest (a façade with picture of
woods 16 cm high × 14 cm wide), a road leading to
both, and a cardboard signpost, (a blue arrow 5 cm
long, 5 cm wide and on a 5 cm pole that allowed it
to rotate). Children were first introduced to the
sign. The experimenter pointed it toward the child,
and asked where it was pointing. The child was
then asked to point the sign at the experimenter.
All children were able to answer the question and
point the sign.
The test phase closely followed Parkin’s (1994)
procedure: “Look, here’s a castle and here’s a for-
est.” And this is the princess. Now, sometimes the
princess likes to play in the castle, and sometimes
she likes to play in the woods. And look, here’s a
signpost. This shows where the princess is. So,
today the princess is playing in the castle [experi-
menter placed princess out of sight behind the cas-
tle]. And look, the signpost points to the castle.
Now, here comes the prince to visit the princess.
He comes and he sees the sign. Then he thinks “I
will fetch the princess a present,” and off he goes
again. But what’s happening here? The princess is
bored of playing in the castle, so she goes to play
in the woods [experimenter moved princess to the
woods, out of sight]. “Now here comes the prince
again.” Children were asked the following ques-
tions:
False sign test question: Where does the sign
show the princess is?
Reality question: Where is the princess really?
Memory question: Can you remember where the
princess was in the beginning?
Children passed the False Sign task if they
answered all three questions correctly.
False Belief task. A short story was acted out
with two Playpeople dolls, a marble, and an opa-
que jar and box. Sally placed a marble in the box
and left. Tony then moved the marble to the jar.
Sally returned and children were asked the follow-
ing questions:
False belief test question: “Where will Sally look
first for her marble?”
Reality question: “Where is the marble really?”
Memory question: “Where did Sally put the mar-
ble in the beginning?”
Figure 1. Jigsaws puzzles used in Experiment 1, normal jigsaw (left), shape-only (middle), and picture only (right).
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Children passed the False Belief task if they
answered all three questions correctly.
Results
Bonferroni confidence interval adjustments and
post hoc Bonferroni analysis were used for the anal-
yses of variance throughout.
False Belief and False Sign
Performances on these tasks for the two age
groups are shown in Table 1. Performance on the
memory control questions were good, and all chil-
dren passed the reality control question for both
tasks. Performances on the test questions improved
with age for both False Belief, χ2 = 27.98, df = 2,
p < .001, and False Sign tasks, χ2 = 39.70, df = 2,
p < .001. Performance increased between 3- and 4-
year-olds (both tasks, p = .001) and 4- and 5-year-
olds (false belief: p = .04; false sign: p < .001;
Mann–Whitney test). The two performances were
strongly associated; r = .57, p < .001, even when
age was controlled for, rpartial = .43, p < .001. Given
their close values and association, for the remainder
of the analysis we combine the two variables as a
single more-stable measure of metarepresentational
ability.
Jigsaw Puzzles
Completion. There were considerable differ-
ences between completion of jigsaw puzzle types
within 3 min, χ2 = 22.24, p < .001 (Friedman-test;
Table 2). Four- and 5-year-old children completed
virtually all puzzles within the time (95% of partici-
pants or greater). Three-year-olds performed less
well. Completion rates of the normal and shape-cue
puzzles were equally good (Binomial, p = 0.625),
and both were completed more often than the pic-
ture-cue puzzle (McNemar, ps ≤ .001).
There were no differences in completion rate
between the guide and no guide conditions for any
jigsaw puzzle, either in the whole sample (all ps >
.32, Mann–Whitney test) or within the 3-year-olds,
the group that made most errors (all ps > .50).
We examined completion ability and metarepre-
sentational performance in the 3-year-old group
only, since older children’s performance
approached ceiling. There was no association
between metarepresentation and the normal or
shape-cue puzzles (r = .11 and r = −.37, respec-
tively), but a substantial correlation with the pic-
ture-cue puzzle, r = .45, p = .015, which did not
change after age was partialed out, r = .45,
p = .017; 15 of the 17 children who did not com-
plete the picture-cue jigsaw failed both metarepre-
sentational tasks, compared to five of the 12 who
completed it.
Completion time. Twenty children did not com-
plete at least one jigsaw puzzle in 3 min, 17 of them
in the 3-year-old group. Analyzing completion time
can thus only be done for part of the sample, one
disproportionately successful at the measure of
metarepresentation. It is nevertheless of interest to
analyze for the remaining children the time it took
to complete each puzzle type. Twelve 3-year-olds
completed all three jigsaw puzzles, six in each of
the guide and no guide conditions. For the follow-
ing analysis we pooled the 3- and 4-year-old partic-
ipants, to create two roughly equal groups: forty-
nine 3- to 4-year-olds, Mage = 52 months, SD =
5.4 months, and forty-eight 5-year-olds, Mage =
67 months, SD = 5.3 months.
Figure 2 shows the completion time for the three
jigsaw puzzles in guide and no guide conditions. A
3 (puzzle type: normal vs. shape-cue vs. picture-
cue; within participants) × 2 (guide picture: no
guide vs. guide; between participants) × 2 (age
Table 1
Mean Proportion Correct Responses on the False Belief (FB), False
Sign (FS), and Respective Memory Control Questions in Experiment 1
3-year-olds
(N = 29)
4-year-olds
(N = 39)
5-year-olds
(N = 40)
FB 0.21 0.62 0.82
FS 0.24 0.64 0.94
FB memory 0.93 1.00 1.00
FS memory 0.98 1.00 0.98
Table 2
Mean Proportion of Completion Within 3 Min as a Function of Age
Group, Jigsaw Puzzle Type, and Guide Use in Experiment 1
3-year-olds
(N = 29)
4-year-olds
(N = 39)
5-year-olds
(N = 40)
Normal jigsaw
No guide 0.93 1.00 1.00
Guide 0.80 1.00 1.00
Shape-only
No guide 0.71 0.95 1.00
Guide 0.87 1.00 1.00
Picture-only
No guide 0.43 1.00 0.96
Guide 0.40 0.95 1.00
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group: 3- to 4-year-olds vs. 5-year-olds; between
participants) repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on completion times showed a main
effect of puzzle type, F(2, 186) = 7.75, p < .001,
η2p = .077. Children completed the normal jigsaw
puzzle more quickly (M = 37.6 s) than both the
shape-cue (M = 50.3 s, p < .002) and picture-cue jig-
saw puzzles (M = 49.8 s, p < .001) which did not
differ. Completion time decreased with age, F(1,
93) = 22.04, p < .001, η2p = .19, where 3- to 4-year-
olds (M = 57.2) required more time than 5-year-olds
(M = 34.4, p < .001). There was no significant Puz-
zle Type × Age group interaction, F(2, 186) = 2.01,
p = .14, η2p = .02.
As shown in Figure 2, children in each age
group completed more quickly when a guide pic-
ture was present (M = 39.8) than without
(M = 52.1), F(1, 93) = 6.47, p = .013, η2p = .07. There
was no Age × Guide interaction, F(1, 93) = 0.97,
p = .33, η2p = .01. However, guide presence inter-
acted with puzzle type, F(2, 186) = 6.14 p < .003,
η2p = .06. Completion was faster with a guide in the
shape-cue puzzle: 37.2 s without guide and 63.7 s
with guide, p < .001. There was no significant dif-
ference for either the normal (38.5 s attempts with-
out and 36.7 s with guide) or the picture-cue
puzzles (54.0 s without and 39.8 s with guide).
Number of attempts. For children who com-
pleted all jigsaw puzzles, number of attempts and
completion time were very strongly related: par-
tialling out age, the correlations between comple-
tion time and number of attempts were for the
normal jigsaw puzzle r = .77, shape-cue r = .85,
and picture-cue, r = .69, all ps < .001. Thus we are
reasonably confident that the two measures are
comparable, and using number of attempts allows
the following analysis to retain all participants.
Figure 3 shows the number of attempts for the
three jigsaw puzzles in guide and no Guide condi-
tions. A 3 (puzzle type: normal vs. shape-cue vs.
picture-cue; within participants) × 2 (guide picture:
no guide vs. guide; between participants) × 3 (age
group: 3- vs. 4- vs. 5-year-olds; between partici-
pants) repeated-measures ANOVA on the number
of attempts made within the time period showed a
main effect of puzzle type, F(2, 222) = 19.39,
p < .001, η2p = .15. Children required fewer attempts
for the normal jigsaw (M = 2.48) than both the
shape-cue (M = 4.19, p < .001) and picture-cue jig-
saw puzzles (M = 4.91 p < .001) which did not dif-
fer (p = .15). The number of attempts decreased
with age, F(2, 111) = 38.27, p < .001, η2p = .41. Adja-
cent age group comparisons show that 3-year-olds
(M = 7.06) required more attempts than 4-year-olds
(M = 3.59, p < .001) who in turn required more
attempts than 5-year-olds (M = 2.12, p = .02). These
two main effects were qualified by a Puzzle Type ×
Age Group interaction, F(4, 222) = 2.67, p = .03,
η2p = .05; 3-year-olds required fewer attempts in
both normal (p < .001) and shape-cue puzzles
(p = .02) than in the picture-cue jigsaw puzzles,
where the first two did not differ. Four-year-olds
required fewer attempts in the normal jigsaw than
both the shape-cue (p < .001) and picture-cue jig-
saw puzzles (p = .001), that did not differ. In con-
trast, 5-year-olds’ attempts did not differ across all
three puzzle types (all ps > .17).
As shown in Figure 3, children in each age
group required fewer attempts when a guide pic-
ture was present (M = 3.49) than without
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Figure 2. Mean time in seconds taken to complete each jigsaw puzzle for each age group in the guide and no guide condition of Exper-
iment 1.
Note. Error bars show 95% CI.
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(M = 5.03), F(1, 111) = 11.34, p = .001, η2p = .09.
There was no Age × Guide interaction, F(2,
111) = 1.18, p = .31, η2p = .02. However, guide pres-
ence interacted with puzzle type, F(2, 222) = 9.81,
p < .001, η2p = .08. Fewer attempts occurred with a
guide in the shape-cue puzzle: 5.97 mean attempts
without guide and 2.27 mean attempts with guide,
p < .001. There was no difference for either the nor-
mal (2.74 attempts without and 2.22 with guide) or
the picture-cue puzzles (5.06 attempts without and
4.76 attempts with guide).
Correlational Analyses
Completion time data exclude most of the 3-
year-olds, and thus present disproportionate suc-
cess on the metarepresentational measures. Thus,
we restrict correlational analysis to the number of
attempts measure. Table 3 shows correlations
between age, metarepresentational performance,
and jigsaw puzzle attempts. Number of attempts
on all three puzzles are associated with both age
and metarepresentational performance, and with
each other. Results for the shape-cue attempts
should be interpreted cautiously given the dispro-
portionate effect of guide condition on this puzzle.
We therefore partial out age and condition (guide
or no guide; Table 3, below the diagonal). When
this was done metarepresentational performance
remained associated with the normal and picture-
cue puzzles, but not the shape-cue.
Discussion Experiment 1
Jigsaw puzzle completion ability improves mark-
edly between the ages of 3- and 5-years. Four- and
5-year-olds could complete jigsaw puzzles in which
the only cues available were based on either shape
or pictorial content. Three-year-olds performed less
well, although most could complete the normal and
shape-cue six-piece jigsaw puzzles within 3 min.
There was a substantial correlation between 3-
year-olds’ ability to complete the picture-only puz-
zle and their performance on the metarepresenta-
tional tasks. This relatively blunt measure supports
the hypothesis that the use of pictorial information
when completing jigsaw puzzles draws on metarep-
resentational understanding.
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Figure 3. Mean number of attempts for each jigsaw puzzle for each age group in the guide and no guide condition of Experiment 1.
Note. Error bars show 95% CI.
Table 3
Correlations Between Age, Metarepresentational Performance, and Jigsaw Puzzle Attempts in Experiment 1. Partial Correlations Controlling for
Age Are Shown Below the Diagonal
Metarepresentation Normal Shape Picture
Age .55*** −.44*** −.35*** −.46***
Metarepresentation — −.46*** −0.29*** −.42***
Normal −.29* — .41*** .45***
Shape −.12 .29* — .30***
Picture −.22* .32* .17 —
*p < .05. ***p < .001.
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Completion time and the number of attempts to
connect pieces provide graded measures of effi-
ciency. Completion time for children who com-
pleted all jigsaw puzzles showed that the normal
jigsaw was completed faster than either the shape-
cue or picture-cue puzzles, and these took almost
the same time. Completion time was faster when a
guide was present, but only significantly so for the
shape-cue puzzle. This puzzle took the longest
without a guide, and roughly the same time as the
normal jigsaw puzzle with a guide. The pattern of
findings was comparable when analyzing the num-
ber of attempts made. Again, presence of a guide
was effective for all age groups, and this effect was
largely restricted to the shape-cue puzzle.
The number of attempts measure was signifi-
cantly associated with metarepresentational under-
standing for all puzzle types; only the jigsaw
puzzles with pictorial information remained corre-
lated with overall metarepresentational perfor-
mance when age and guide presence was partialled
out. This supports our hypothesis that children
who show evidence of metarepresentational under-
standing will complete jigsaw puzzles with pictorial
content more efficiently.
The effectiveness of the guide suggests that chil-
dren were using the spatial correspondence. How-
ever, they were not doing so for jigsaw puzzles
with pictorial content. This challenges our claim
that metarepresentational understanding of pictures
should allow children to exploit this correspon-
dence relationship.
However, other factors may make this difficult:
the visual simplicity of the shape-cue puzzle plausi-
bly makes the correspondence with the guide easier
to utilize than for the pictorial jigsaw puzzles: the
bottom right corner of the puzzle is blue, and one
piece is entirely blue, whereas in the other puzzles
the bottom right piece has part of a sheep in it, as
do four of the other five pieces. Thus the question
remains whether children consulted the guide for
the jigsaw puzzles with pictorial content, but were
not good at utilizing the information, or whether
they only consulted it for the shape-cue puzzle. The
design of Experiment 1 does not allow us to distin-
guish these two possibilities. This is the aim of
Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
To examine whether children also consult the guide
for other jigsaw puzzle types, and whether they can
use the information in principle, we reduced jigsaw
puzzle task demands to a minimum. Children had to
select the correct final piece of a partially completed
four-piece jigsaw puzzle, avoiding a plausible and
implausible distractor. Being certain of the correct
choice required consulting a guide picture.
There were three puzzle-guide conditions,
selected so the match could be: only made on the
basis of color; only on the basis of pictorial content
(removing the color from the guide); or on the basis
of both. Thus conditions were as follows: (a) color
(a puzzle with each piece a different color, and cor-
responding guide); (b) outline (e.g., a colored car
puzzle, and a line-drawing car on the guide); and
(c) normal (e.g., colored tree puzzle and colored
tree on guide).
Performance was compared to the same mea-
sures of metarepresentational development as in
Experiment 1. Verbal mental age (VMA) was mea-
sured, to examine the specificity of any relation-
ships.
Method
Participants
Participants were 52 children (30 girls), twenty-
seven 3-year-olds (M = 3;6, SD = 3 months, VMA
M = 3;10, SD = 11 months) and twenty-five 4-year-
olds (M = 4;5, SD = 3 months, VMA M = 5;2, SD =
16 months) from predominantly white middle-class
nurseries (two university preschools and one pri-
vate nursery) in Edinburgh and Norwich, United
Kingdom. All children spoke English as a first lan-
guage. One 3- and three 4-year-olds’ VMA could
not be measured due to test scheduling constraints.
Inclusion, exclusion, and stopping criteria were as
for Experiment 1.
Design
The jigsaw puzzle, False Sign, and False Belief
tasks were administered in counterbalanced order,
after which the British Picture Vocabulary Scale,
2nd ed. (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997)
was administered according to the manual.
Materials
There were two trials each of three different jig-
saw puzzle types. See Figure 4. All were four-piece
jigsaw puzzles with one-piece missing. Each puzzle
had a guide. There were three candidate pieces
shaped to fit in the empty position. One completed
the picture shown in the guide; one formed a
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satisfactory picture, but differed from that shown in
the guide; one was unsuitable. The unsuitable
pieces were, for the Normal and Outline jigsaw
puzzles part of one of the other pictures, but
rotated clockwise through 90°, and for the Color
puzzles an uncolored (i.e., white) piece. The guides
for the Normal and Color puzzles were identical to
the final image. The guide for the Outline puzzle
was a monochrome outline otherwise identical to
the color puzzle image. Each picture jigsaw puzzle
featured in either the normal guide or outline guide
trials, randomized between children.
Figure 4. An example set of jigsaws puzzles in Experiment 2: from top to bottom, two normal, two color, and two outline jigsaw puz-
zles.
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Procedure
The experimenter placed the partially completed
jigsaw puzzle in front of the child with the guide
above it, and said “make this jigsaw [points at the
jigsaw puzzle] look exactly like this picture [points
at the guide].” Three pieces that all fitted in shape
were then placed below the puzzle in random
order: the correct piece, an alternative piece that
differed from the guide, but made a valid picture,
and a piece with clearly incongruous content. The
experimenter watched the child, noting whether the
child looked back at the guide after the pieces had
been laid out before choosing.
The dependent variables were whether the cor-
rect piece was selected and whether children looked
back at the guide after the pieces had been laid out
before choosing. Children first had one jigsaw puz-
zle of each type, then False Belief and False Sign
tasks administered as in Experiment 1, followed by
the remaining puzzles, one of each type. The order
of puzzle type and False Belief and False Sign tasks
was fully counterbalanced between children.
Results
Jigsaw Puzzles
Both 3- and 4-year-olds performed significantly
above chance on the six trials, p = 1/3, t(23) = 3.54,
p = .002, t(27) = 10.26, p < .001, respectively.
Number of times children chose the correct piece
for each puzzle type is shown in Figure 5. There
were no differences in the three puzzle types, either
overall (Friedman χ2 = 2.75, p = .25) or within each
age group (3 years: Friedman χ2 = 1.20, p = .55;
4 years: Friedman χ2 = 3.96, p = .138). Figure 6
shows that similarly, there were no differences
between the number of looks-to-guide for the three
jigsaw puzzle types, either overall (Friedman
χ2 = 0.98, p = .67) or within each age group
(3 years: Friedman χ2 = 0.78, p = .68; 4 years: Fried-
man χ2 = 1.54, p = .46). Correct choices for each
type were correlated (all rs > .32, all ps < .03) as
were looks for each type (all rs > .44, all ps ≤ .001.
The scores for correct choices and for looks-to-guide
were therefore summed. Total correct-choice
improved between 3 and 4 years (Mann–Whitney
U = 193, p = .007). Total Looks-to-guide increased
between the two age groups, falling short of con-
ventional significance (Mann–Whitney U = 235,
p = .056).
False Belief and False Sign tasks
Performances on each task improved between 3
and 4 years: False Belief, M = 0.37 and M = 0.80
respectively, Mann–Whitney U = 193.00, p = .002;
False Sign, M = 0.22 and M = 0.72, respectively,
Mann–Whitney U = 166, p < .001. The two tasks
did not differ in difficulty, Wilcoxon Z = 1.34,
p = .18. However, the two tasks were not strongly
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Figure 5. Mean choices of correct puzzle piece for the three jigsaw puzzle types in Experiment 2.
Note. Error bars show 95% CI.
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correlated in this experiment, r = .25, p = .078. We
report them combined as in Experiment 1, as well
as separately.
Correlational Analyses
Table 4 examines relations between age, VMA, jig-
saw puzzle mean accuracy, jigsaw puzzle number of
looks at guide, and performances on the False Belief
and False Sign tasks. Puzzle accuracy was related to
whether the guide was consulted, and remained so
after partialling out age and VMA. Puzzle accuracy
and guide use were related to metarepresentational
performance, the relation with guide use remaining
strong after age and VMA had been partialled out.
As can be seen from Table 4, these relationships are
strongest for false sign performance.
Discussion
The jigsaw puzzle task in Experiment 2 reduced
the demands to a minimum, requiring children to
simply select the matching piece from three alterna-
tives. To be certain of being correct children had to
consult the guide because two of the pieces would
form a valid picture. Under these simplified condi-
tions guide use did not differ between the different
types of jigsaw puzzle, and increased between 3
and 4 years.
Guide use was significantly associated with
metarepresentational performance, beyond common
effects of chronological and VMA. This finding
should be interpreted with caution, as the tendency
to consult the guide was weakly related to False
Belief performance. Despite very similar levels of
performance the False Belief and False Sign tasks
were not strongly related in this experiment; we do
not know why. Nevertheless, we conclude that
understanding of the usefulness of the guide
increases between 3 and 4 years, and is related
to at least one measure of metarepresentational
development.
General Discussion
In two experiments we employed jigsaw puzzle
completion to examine children’s understanding of
pictorial representation. We find that the use of pic-
torial information to aid jigsaw puzzle completion
and the tendency to utilize a guide picture both
develop in the preschool period. Both abilities are
associated with mental and graphical measures of
metarepresentation. We conclude this is confirma-
tory evidence of development of a general metarep-
resentational understanding around the age of
4 years. Jigsaw puzzles are a particularly apposite
test of this ability: children do play with jigsaw
puzzles outside of experiments, and, unlike many
other measures of metarepresentation, performance
is unlikely to be affected by misunderstanding of
the task demands or pragmatic misinterpretation.
Figure 6. Mean looks o guide before choosing a puzzle piece for the three jigsaw puzzle types in Experiment 2.
Note. Error bars show 95% CI.
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Our specific focus was on two aspects of jigsaw
puzzle completion that relate to the tendency to use
pictorial information to aid completion: develop-
ment of use of pictorial versus shape information,
and the tendency to consult and use information
from a guide showing the final picture. In Experi-
ment 1, we examined the ability to use pictorial
information in jigsaw puzzle completion. Younger
children were specifically poor at using pictorial
cues to aid completion. Use of pictorial information
was strongly and specifically associated with tasks
measuring mental and graphical metarepresenta-
tion. These findings suggest that the use of pictorial
information in jigsaw puzzle completion reflects the
development of a general concept of representation,
which is evident in the mental, graphical and picto-
rial domain. This adds to the body of literature
showing linked metarepresentational developments
across the linguistic, mental, and pictorial domains
(Diaz & Farrar, 2018; Doherty & Perner, 1998; Doh-
erty & Wimmer, 2005; Gollek, & Doherty, 2016; Per-
ner & Roessler, 2012; Perner et al., 2002; Wimmer &
Doherty, 2011). Specifically, we suggest that chil-
dren begin to understand that pictorial elements,
such as lines and patches of color, can be arranged
to produce a picture. This understanding is a criti-
cal stage in the ability to draw and paint.
More broadly, this finding also has theoretical
relevance to suggestions that young children only
fail theory of mind tasks because of the pragmatic
demands of the tasks (e.g., Westra & Carruthers,
2017). These claims imply that performance should
not associate with representational tasks that do not
make the same pragmatic demands. A case could
be made that previous nonmental metarepresenta-
tional tasks share many of the pragmatic demands
of theory of mind tasks. They were after all
designed with direct comparison to the False Belief
task in mind (e.g., Doherty & Perner, 1998; Farrar,
Ashwell, & Maag, 2005; Wimmer & Doherty, 2011).
However, it is hard to see how the jigsaw puzzle
tasks employed here would be subject to pragmatic
misinterpretation. Children were simply asked to
complete jigsaw puzzles, an activity we believe that
most of our participants have experience of.
Granted we did not measure degree of familiarity
with jigsaw puzzles, but potentially poor perfor-
mance as a result of lack of familiarity would differ
in underlying nature to poor performance as a
result of pragmatic misinterpretation. Thus it is
hard to see why it should relate to pragmatic diffi-
culties hypothesized to impair false belief perfor-
mance.
Together, the experiments showed that children
could use the spatial correspondence between a
guide picture and the completed puzzle, as long as
task complexity was kept to a minimum. The effec-
tiveness of the guide for the shape-cue puzzle in
Experiment 1 was unrelated to age. This suggests
that even 3-year-olds can use spatial correspon-
dence in principle, in turn suggesting it is a precur-
sor to understanding representation rather than a
simultaneous development. A key theoretical dis-
tinction between understanding simple correspon-
dence and understanding correspondence in a
representational relation is understanding that the
relation should or is meant to obtain (Blades &
Cooke, 1994; Perner, 1991). The shift to understand-
ing the correspondence relation as representational
should increase the probability of attending to and
utilizing this relation. This was confirmed in Experi-
ment 2 by children’s increasing tendency to consult
the guide before selecting the jigsaw piece, and the
substantial and significant association of this ten-
dency to metarepresentational performance.
In other words, the ability to detect and use
correspondence information in our jigsaw puzzle
tasks is present from at least the age of 3 years and
does not require metarepresentational understand-
ing. However, metarepresentational understanding
Table 4
Correlations of Performance and Partial Correlations Below the Diagonal Controlling for Age and Verbal Mental Age (VMA) in Experiment 2
VMA Jigsaw accuracy Jigsaw guide look False belief False sign Metarepresentation
Age .50*** .37** .26† .43** .50*** .61***
VMA — .35* .00 .53*** .28† .50***
Accuracy — .47*** .22 .45*** .43**
Guide look .53*** — .18 .40** .37**
False belief .06 .28† — .25†
False sign .32* .42** .08 —
Metarepresentation .24 .45**
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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allows children to understand why the relationship
exists, and therefore increases the probability of
their attending to and utilizing it.
Limitations
This conclusion must be made with caution
because in Experiment 2 the two chosen measures
of metarepresentational understanding were not
themselves closely related. Guide consultation was
primarily related to false sign performance. The
False Sign task had been hypothesized to be partic-
ularly apt comparator for guide use, since both
indicate how a state of affairs should be. However,
although these might be grounds to predict a stron-
ger relation with the False Sign task, we still pre-
dicted a relation with the False Belief task. Since
this did not obtain, we make no more detailed
speculation.
It is possible that our choice of false sign proce-
dure influenced the reliability of the association
between the two tasks. We modelled our task on
Parkin’s (1994) procedure. Although simple and
brief, other versions of the task provide more plau-
sible reasons for the sign to indicate a location.
Arguably signs do not usually function to indicate
the location of people. Another version used by
Parkin (1994) involved the sign indicating the loca-
tion of an ice cream van, which is a more obviously
useful function. Bowler et al. (2005) went a step fur-
ther by having instead a false signal to guide an
automatic train, which closely matches the real use
of signals. Thus, children may have performed less
well on our version than in previous studies
because the informing function of the sign was less
natural or obvious. Nevertheless, if this were so it
is not clear why it should only have been so in one
experiment, nor why performance was not measur-
ably different from false belief performance. The
issue remains to be resolved in future work.
A further limitation is one of scope. We did not
examine spatial abilities, other than indirectly mea-
suring children’s ability and inclination to use geo-
metrical correspondence. We are confident that the
development of jigsaw puzzle completion ability is
related to spatial development more generally.
Levine et al.’s (2012) observational study of 2- to 3-
year-olds naturalistic play demonstrates subsequent
associations with at least one spatial skill. Young
et al. (2014) show that training with spatial lan-
guage can enhance jigsaw puzzle completion skill,
if accompanied by gesture. This places jigsaw puz-
zles in the context of other work examining the
rapid development of spatial skills from preschool
onwards (e.g., Schmitt, Korucu, Napoli, Bryant, &
Purpura, 2018; Verdine, Golinkoff, Hirsh-Pasek, &
Newcombe, 2017). Verdine et al. (2017) demonstrate
that spatial skills measured at 3 years predict math-
ematical skills up to 2 years later, and argue for
spatial skills’ foundational importance in science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics educa-
tion. As Kuhl, Lim, Guerriero, and van Damme
(2019) suggest, play with spatial toys, including jig-
saw puzzles, is likely to enhance these skills.
A full examination of the development of jigsaw
puzzle completion ability would include the many
spatial skills such play may enhance. This study
serves to suggest that jigsaw puzzle play also
involves fundamental understanding of the nature
of pictures, a finding which is unique to this study.
Whether play with jigsaw puzzles enhances this
understanding remains to be tested, as does
whether pictorial understanding interacts with spa-
tial understanding at this age. Young et al.’s (2014)
training study’s findings are promising in this
regard. Their control condition involved pointing
out nonspatial pictorial information, for example,
“This piece has some light blue colors, so it will go
in the sky.” This also led to substantial improve-
ment, regardless of gesture.
Other issues where pictorial and spatial under-
standing interact include the understanding of
maps. Maps have clear spatial functions, and typi-
cally correspond geometrically to the space they
represent. Mature understanding of them also
requires understanding of the symbols on them and
the fact that they are graphic representations
(Blades & Spencer, 1987; Liben & Downs, 1989).
This understanding may be protracted, particularly
if one considers understanding of the intentions of
the cartographer (Myers & Liben, 2012). Mental
imagery, may also in some contexts plausibly
involve both the understanding of the mental image
as a picture (e.g., Estes, 1998) and as a spatial
object, as occurs in mental rotation (Levine et al.,
2012; Wimmer, Maras, Robinson, Doherty, & Pug-
eault, 2015; Wimmer, Maras, Robinson, & Thomas,
2016).
Summary and Conclusion
In two experiments, we examined the role of pic-
torial metarepresentation in jigsaw puzzle comple-
tion. In Experiment 1, we found that the ability to
complete jigsaw puzzles containing pictorial infor-
mation improved between 3- and 5 years and was
associated with mental and graphical metarepresen-
tational ability, measured by the False Belief and
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False Sign tasks. Experiment 1 provided limited
indication that children can utilize the correspon-
dence between a guide to the target image in com-
pleting a jigsaw puzzle. In Experiment 2, simplified
jigsaw puzzles requiring the selection of a single
piece were used. The tendency to consult the guide
image increased from 3- to 4-years, and was associ-
ated with metarepresentational performance. We
conclude that improvements in jigsaw puzzle com-
pletion are part of a general development of
metarepresentational ability at around 4 years, and
this includes the understanding that representations
should correspond to their referents. We suggest
that jigsaw puzzles are a natural and useful tool to
study the development of both children’s spatial
abilities and their understanding of pictorial repre-
sentation.
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